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Adam’s Tongue, as its title surely indicates, is about the transition from the 
alingual state that characterizes all other species to something that might qualify 
as a genuine precursor of language, thereby opening the road for (not, pace Balari 
& Lorenzo—henceforth B&L—making “inevitable”) the subsequent development 
of true language. It is thus illogical to complain, as B&L do, that it lacks explana-
tions of “agreement, questions, anaphora” and similar components of full human 
language; inevitably, given the book’s scope, such features of later development 
are touched on briefly, if at all. The book’s secondary goal is to explain why 
human cognition as well as human communication differs so radically from that 
of other species. 
 B&L do not even try to deal with these issues. At least they are embar-
rassed by their omission of the first, and feel obliged to excuse it by claiming that 
the debate over the initial emergence of language is now “sterile” and too ideo-
logical to be pursued further (they fail to note the irony of proposing, in a bio-
linguistic journal, an embargo on the most crucial issue in biolinguistics). With 
regard to the second issue, they simply ignore it. Later I will suggest a possible 
motivation for this. 
 Adam’s Tongue (Bickerton 2009a, sometimes abbreviated as AT, as used by 
B&L) is neither a textbook of evolutionary biology nor a primer of niche con-
struction theory (NCT); it merely utilizes some concepts from these areas in its 
arguments. Yet amazingly it is on such incidental uses of biology and NCT that 
B&L almost exclusively focus. Granted, if I had really gone wrong here, the 
book’s major contentions would be seriously flawed. But in fact it’s B&L who are 
at fault. What they claim I say is far from what I actually say—sometimes even its 
exact opposite. And when they do quote me correctly, it turns out that I’m saying 
exactly what they’re saying. 
 One claim they make is directly refuted by one of the sentence they 
themselves cite. In section 3, speaking of the directional arrow in evolutionary 
processes, they state “Bickerton sees a single causal arrow pointing in one 
direction only, namely from the outside to the inside” (p. 118). Just a couple of 
pages later, at the beginning of section 4, they quote my actual words (AT: 99–
100): “So a feedback process begins, a two-way street in which the animal is 
developing the niche and the niche is developing the animal” (p. 120). 
                                                           
      Thanks to the kindness of the editors, I have read the response by Balari & Lorenzo. Given 
that the latter fail to react to the substantive points I made, but instead continue to attribute 
to me views I have never held, I see no purpose in further comment on my part. 
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 Other claims are simply bizarre, such as that according to me, “given some 
appropriate genetic fiddling, appropriate environmental conditions could turn 
ants and bees […] into fully-fledged linguistic beings (if they aren’t already, see 
AT: 136–137)” (p. 119). In fact, all these two pages do is conclude, after a purely 
factual description of certain ant behaviors involving combinations of signals, 
that “this isn’t quite like joining words. The shaking and the chemical trail may 
be meaningless in themselves, so it’s more like the joining together of in-them-
selves-meaningless speech sounds that we do to make words. But it’s still 
concatenation of a kind; a kind that, primitive as it is, is found seldom if at all 
among the behaviors of other species”. 
 Not a word, note, about the potentiality of ants to become “full-fledged 
linguistic beings”, let alone their already being such. Indeed, if B&L had read a 
few pages further they would have seen that I explicitly reject any notion of ant 
or bee communication as even remotely ancestral to language: “How could 
things like these possibly be precursors of language? They’re not […]. The 
question is not so much why our species got [language] and no other did, it’s 
why any species got it at all” [AT: 144; original emphasis—DB]. So much for my 
alleged belief that “some appropriate genetic fiddling” could equip ants or any 
other species with language. 
 B&L also employ the Damning Context-Free Quote. Example: “It was, after 
all, the development of powered flight that eventually caused genes normally 
devoted to building front legs to express themselves, among birds and bats, in 
the form of wings” (AT: 131). Nothing in B&L’s (p. 122) deconstruction of this 
piece (“So, first came flight and only thereafter genes started making wings”) 
suggests that this sentence occurs, not as part of any general description of devel-
opment, but in parentheses, in the middle of a paragraph devoted to an entirely 
different topic, where its sole function is to remind readers of a connection with 
two other topics, deep homology and flight, that have already been fully dis-
cussed elsewhere (AT: 129–130 and 9, respectively). In those discussions, readers 
will find all the details of gradualness and reciprocal influence in development 
that B&L accuse me of misunderstanding or ignoring. 
 On other occasions, B&L state my views, pour scorn on them, then express 
similar views themselves. This strategy is so remarkable that it demands at least 
two specific examples.  
 Example 1: They respond to my claim that behavioral innovations drive 
brain re-wiring, rather than vice versa, with “Well, this is plainly false. Brains do 
rewire themselves when they get bigger”. And what makes them get bigger? 
B&L (p. 120): “[S]ome of these episodes of brain growth correlate with behavioral 
innovations”.  
 Example 2: They describe my treatment of NCT as “a serious perversion” 
of that theory. But here, side by side, are our respective summaries of NCT (see if 
you can spot the difference): 
 
[A] constructive, dialectical model in which genes, organism and environ-
ment are an integral part of the same cyclical developmental process, where 
organism and environment co-construct each other in a never-ending 
process.                    (B&L: 124) 
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[A]nimals themselves modify the environments they live in, and these 
modified environments, in turn, select for further genetic variations in the 
animal. So a feedback process begins, a two-way street in which the animal 
is developing the niche and the niche is developing the animal.  (AT: 99) 
 
The only difference I can see is that mine is fourteen words longer but a whole lot 
easier to understand. What’s almost unbelievable is that B&L themselves have 
already cited the second half of it, not as a summary of NCT, but with the 
comment “this looks like garden-variety adaptationism” (p. 121). How can they 
accuse me of perverting a theory if they can’t even recognize that theory when 
they see it? 
 Heinous as they are, B&L’s sins of commission pale before their sins of 
omission. I have already referred to their refusal to address one of the two core 
issues of the book—how language got off the ground (to add insult to injury, in 
their conclusion they dismiss this issue as merely “one of the many secondary 
factors” (p.124), though it occupies the first two-thirds of the book and should be 
central to any discussion of language evolution.) I shall therefore confine myself 
to the second issue, the role of language in forming human cognition. 
 I argue that, instead of enhanced cognition giving rise to language, as so 
may believe, language (from its very earliest manifestations) gave rise to 
enhanced cognition. In addition, I propose specific mechanisms by which this 
might have come about. Those proposals may be wildly wrong, but you 
wouldn’t learn that from B&L’s review. Nor would you know that the book 
contains extensive criticism of a currently popular approach to language origins 
that places those origins in the mind rather than in communication (Hauser et al. 
2002)—an approach to which, though they are somewhat coy about it, B&L 
obviously subscribe. Rather than answer these criticisms (to which one and a half 
out of a dozen chapters are devoted) B&L prefer to pretend that they don’t exist. 
And I suspect I know why. 
 The non-communicative approach holds the following beliefs (fully 
documented in Adam’s Tongue): 
 
(A) The key development in language, perhaps the only one unique to it, was 
recursion, created by “Merge”. 
 
(B) Before language was “externalized”, Merge created recursive structures in 
the mind, linking concepts. 
 
(C) The concepts that Merge linked had to differ from animal concepts in that 
they did not, like the latter, refer to “mind-independent entities” (i.e. direct-
ly, to real-world objects), but instead were symbolic in nature, representing 
abstract categories (Chomsky 2010). 
 
In other words, before recursion could operate (therefore, before language could 
start), a new type of concept had to emerge. Where did such concepts come 
from? How and why did they form? In Adam’s Tongue I try to answer such 
questions. My answers may not be correct, but they are at least answers. 
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 The non-communicative approach hasn’t even got that far. It has no 
answers. Supporters of this approach cannot afford even to look at the language-
cognition interface, since doing so would force them to admit this gaping hole in 
their theory, and probably also to concede that, contra (A), there may be at least 
two components to the Faculty of Language (Narrow)—symbolic concepts as 
well as recursion. But, as Adam’s Tongue also shows, recursion itself is dubious as 
a uniquely language-devoted function. Recursion can be defined in two ways; 
basic assumptions of Minimalism show that the stronger is simply an artifact of 
earlier generative formulations, while the weaker would hold for a wide variety 
of non-linguistic behaviors by both humans and other animals (see also Bickerton 
2009b). But again, not a word about any of this from B&L. 
 The motives behind this review should by now be apparent; likewise its 
choice of targets. B&L are doubtless familiar with the nest-defense strategies of 
golden plovers (Byrkjedal 1989). When its eggs or nestlings are at risk from an 
approaching predator, this plover tries to draw the predator away by elaborate, 
albeit bogus behaviors (feigning wing injury, limping along on the ground, etc.), 
B&L’s review has a similar distracting function. Finding their cherished ideas 
menaced by the central arguments of Adam’s Tongue, they avoid any confron-
tation with those arguments (just as the plover avoids any confrontation with the 
predator) and instead seek to draw attention away from the vulnerable target 
(just as the plover does) by moving the discourse elsewhere, even though, in 
order to do so, they have to resort to behaviors as deceptive as the plover’s 
dragging wing. 
 Ironically, B&L’s negative review serves to support the core arguments of 
Adam’s Tongue more convincingly than the most favorable review could have 
done. The latter might merely reflect the reviewer’s bias. But B&L’s review can 
lead to only one conclusion. The book’s central claims are that language emerged 
from certain specific communicative uses, and that language created human 
cognition, rather than vice versa. If critics as determinedly hostile as B&L did not 
even try to refute these claims, it can only be because they were unable to do so.  
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